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Abstract 
Grefen, P.W.P.J. and P.M.G. Apers, Integrity control in relational database systems - An overview, Data & 
Knowledge Engineering 10 (1993) 187-223. 
This paper gives an overview of research regarding integrity control or integrity constraint handling in 
relational database management systems. The topic of constraint handling is discussed from two points of 
view. First, constraint handling is discussed by identifying a number of important research issues, and by 
treating each issue in detail. Second, a number of projects is described that have resulted in the realization of 
database management systems supporting integrity constraints; the various projects are compared with 
respect o a number of system characteristics. Together, both approaches give a broad overview of the state 
of the art in the field at this moment. 
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1. Introduction 
The complexity of modern database applications requires powerful facilities for controlling 
the semantic orrectness of the data in the database. The consequences of the absence of 
such facilities are convincingly illustrated in [8, 69], where some striking anomalies in the 
records of a health organization are presented. The requirement of semantic data control has 
led to a number of research projects in the context of relational database systems. The first 
projects started in the mid-seventies, together with the development of the first relational 
database management systems, like System R and INGRES. The basic issues have become 
clear by now, but research continues into new areas, like easy specification of constraints and 
definition of complex constraint ypes, verification and optimization of constraint specifica- 
tions, efficient constraint enforcement algorithms and parallelism in constraint enforcement. 
This paper focusses on constraint handling in relational systems, but, where interesting, 
side trips are made to other types of database systems. 
1.1. Structure of this paper 
This paper gives a broad overview of research performed in the field of semantic data 
control or integrity constraint handling in the context of relational database systems. This 
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concept is explained in the section below. Section 2 gives a short formal background on 
databases, integrity constraints, and transactions. This section also introduces the example 
database used throughout his paper. The research in the field of integrity constraint 
handling is discussed from two points of view in Sections 3 and 4 of this paper. In the first 
place, integrity constraint handling is discussed by identifying a number of important 
research issues, and treating each issue in detail. In the second place, a number of projects 
are described that have resulted in the realization of database systems upporting integrity 
constraints; the various projects are compared with respect o a number of system charac- 
teristics. Together, both approaches give a broad overview of the state of the art in the field 
at this moment. 
1.2. The integrity concept 
As stated above, in a database management system, the correctness or accuracy of data is 
of great importance. There are a number of ways in which incorrect data may occur in a 
database. The following disciplines in database technology try to prevent certain classes of 
errors [35, 51, 31]: 
Security control deals with preventing users from accessing and modifying data in a database 
in unauthorized ways; the security control subsystem of a DBMS keeps record of the 
authorization of users to perform certain operations on certain data and checks this 
authorization upon database access [29, 34]. 
Concurrency control deals with the prevention of inconsistencies caused by concurrent access 
of multiple users or applications to a database; the concurrency control subsystem 
orchestrates the access to the database, in most cases using a locking or timestamping 
technique [29, 59, 34]. 
Reliability control deals with the prevention of errors due to the malfunctioning of system 
hardware or software; the reliability control subsystem uses recovery techniques to 
reinstall a correct database after system crashes [29, 59], and techniques like replication of 
data to increase the reliability of the system [16]. 
Integrity control deals with the prevention of semantic errors made by users due to their 
carelessness or lack of knowledge; the integrity control subsystem uses integrity rules to 
verify the database and operations on the database. 
This paper is concerned only with the integrity control discipline. 
The term integrity as used throughout this paper refers to the correctness or validity of the 
data in the database, as defined explicitly by means of integrity rules or integrity constraints. ~ 
This implies that neither the full correctness with respect to the part of the real world 
modeled by the database is guaranteed in general, nor the completeness of the facts stored in 
the database; a detailed discussion of this topic can be found in [67]. 
1.3. Integrity control allocation 
An important question to be answered is who or what is responsible for keeping a 
1Note that there is quite some confusion in terminology here: the terms integrity, consistency, validity, 
correctness, etc. may be used differently by different authors. 
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database consistent with a number of specified integrity constraints (integrity control). In 
general, the task of integrity control can be allocated in three ways: 
Application designer The integrity control task can be left to the application designer or ad 
hoc user of the database system. As such, no robustness with respect o integrity is offered 
at all: applications and ad hoc transactions are required to be individually correct with 
respect o the integrity constraints. 
Transaction designer The integrity control task can be the responsibility of the transaction 
designer. This means that transactions are required to be correct with respect o specified 
constraints. In this situation, applications can only make use of predefined transactions. 
Database Management System The database management system can have the responsibility 
for integrity control. This means that arbitrary transactions can be executed on the system. 
In the first case, the integrity of the database is not guaranteed by a central specification of 
the database itself, but only by the design of the (numerous and ever changing) applications 
operating on the database. Consequently, the chance of improper constraint control is high. 
Further, changes of some constraint definitions require modification of all applications 
including integrity control with respect o these definitions. This is an undesirable situation, 
although it may occur frequently in practice. 
In the second case, the responsibility for integrity control is part of the transaction design 
process [38, 92]. Again, changes to constraint definitions require modification of all 
transactions including integrity control with respect o these definitions. In a situation with 
many constraints, transactions can get very complex. Further, this approach is hardly feasible 
in a situation with a high rate of ad hoc transactions. 
If the integrity control task is allocated with the database management system, the 
integrity of the database is effectively ruled by a central set of constraint definitions. 
Applications and transactions can be fully unaware of integrity control. A disadvantage of
this approach may be a reduced flexibility with respect o constraint handling (a different 
handling of constraint violations per application or transaction type is not possible). 
The latter two approaches are described in research, and the choice between them 
depends on many criteria like the application domain, the actual usage of a database system, 
performance requirements etc. This paper is mainly concerned with fully automatic integrity 
control with transparency to all users of the database system, and therefore mainly adopts 
the DBMS-based approach. Some attention is devoted to the transaction-based approach as 
well, however. 
2. A formal background for integrity constraints 
As stated above, the integrity of a database is stated explicitly by means of integrity 
constraints, i.e. rules that define properties to be satisfied by the database. This section gives 
a formal background on integrity constraints that serves as a basis for the sequel of this 
paper. First, some elementary database notions are introduced in short. Then, the concept of 
integrity constraint is introduced in a database context. Finally, the relation between 
integrity constraints and transactions i discussed. This section concludes with the intro- 
duction of a simple example database that will be used throughout the paper to illustrate 
concepts and techniques. 
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2.1. Elementary database notions 
The database notions to be used in the formal description of database integrity are relation 
schemas and states, database schemas and states, and database transitions. These notions are 
defined below. 
Definition 2.1. A relation schema ~ consists of a relation name and a list of attributes 
(A  I, . . . , A n ). Each attribute A~ is defined on a domain dom(A~). The type of ~ is defined 
as dom(~ ) = dom(A 1) x • • • x dom(A ~). A relation or relation instance R of relation schema 
consists of the relation name of ~ and a set of elements in dom(~) .  
Definition 2.2. A database schema @ is a set of relation schemas { ~1,  " " " ' ~n  }" A database 
or database instance D of database schema @ is a set of relation instances {R~, . . . ,  Rn}. The 
set of all possible database instances of schema ~ is called the database universe U~, so 
U~ = dom(~ 1) x . . .  x dom(~ n). 
Definition 2.3. A database transition of database schema ~ is an ordered pair of database 
states (D q, D re) of schema ~, with tl, t 2 E [~ and t 1 < t 2. The values tI and t 2 are the logical 
times of the database states. 
Usually, a database transition describes two successive states of the database, so t 2 = t I + 1 in 
the definition above. This type of transition is called a single-step transition. If not stated 
otherwise, the term transition is used for single-step transitions in this paper. 
2.2. Databases and integrity constraints 
Below, the concept of integrity constraint is defined. In this definition, constraints are 
divided into state constraints that describe properties of database states, and transition 
constraints that describe properties of database transitions. This distinction is necessary to 
come to a correct definition of integrity constraints; a more detailed classification of 
constraints is discussed in Section 3. 
Definition 2.4. Let ~ be a database schema. A state constraint I s is a boolean function that is 
evaluated over a database state D from the database universe U~ defined on ~:  
I s: U~ --~ bool.  
Definition 2.5. A correct database state D E U~ satisfies each element of a set of state 
constraints ~ = { I ] , . . . ,  I~,} defined on ~. The set of correct database states with schema 
and constraint set 5 ~s is denoted as: 
i~m / : (O))  , 
U~" {DeU~ i=1  
A state constraint describes the static properties of a database, i.e. the properties that a 
database should satisfy at one given moment. 
Definition 2.6. Let ~ be a database schema. A transition constraint I' is a boolean function 
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that is evaluated over a pair of database states or database transition (D~, D2) defined on 
9 2 
I ' :  U~ x U~ ~ bool .  
Definition 2.7. A correct database transition (D 1, D 2) defined on schema @ satisfies each 
element of a set of transition constraints `9' = {I '1 , . . . ,  Itn} defined on 9. The set of correct 
database transitions with schema 9 and constraint set ` gt is denoted as: 
V~' 
A transition constraint describes the correct transitions of a database; as such, it describes 
dynamic properties of a database. Therefore, transition constraints are also referred to as 
dynamic constraints. 
2.3. Transactions and integrity constraints 
The integrity of the database in terms of integrity constraints as defined above has its 
effect on the set of transactions that are allowed to be executed and successfully committed 
against a database. 
The fact that each database state has to satisfy all state constraints means that the 
execution of a transaction T on a correct state D may never result in a database state that 
violates any constraint in `9'; so the following should hold: 
(ili~=m 1 l:(O))~ (i~= li=mlT(z(o))), 
or in short notation: 
Ys(O) ff YS(T(D)). 
The fact that each database transition has to satisfy all transition constraints means that given 
a correct database state, the execution of a transaction T may never imply a transition that 
violates any constraint in `9,; so the following should always hold: 
(ili~=m l [:(O )) * (i~= li n I:(o, T(D ))) , 
or again in short: 
`9"(D) f f  `g'(D, T(D)) . 
Given these observations, we can define the correctness of a transaction as follows. 
Definition 2.8. A transaction T is correct with respect o a correct database state D and a set 
of integrity constraints `9 if and only if a committed execution of T on D does not imply a 
database transition that violates any transition constraint in ,9, and the post-transaction 
database state T(D) does not violate any state constraint in `9. A transaction that does not 
comply with this requirement is called incorrect. 
The concept of correctness of a transaction is essentially different from the concept of 
safeness of a transaction as defined below. 
2 We limit ourselves here to single-step transitions; ome remarks on general transitions can be found in Section 
3.1. 
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Definition 2.9. A transaction T is safe with respect to a database schema @ and a set of 
integrity constraints 5 ~ if and only if a committed execution of T on any correct state D E U~ 
does not imply a database transition that violates any transition constraint in 5~, and the 
post-transaction database state T(D)  does not violate any state constraint in 5~. A transaction 
that is not safe is called unsafe. 
Note that the above definition of integrity constraints only considers the database states 
before and after the execution of transactions. This approach is based on the fact that 
transactions are considered to be atomic units of operations against a database; intermediate 
database states during transaction execution have therefore no semantics. Some approaches 
to integrity control, however, do take the intermediate database states during transaction 
execution into consideration (see Section 3.2), thereby rejecting the atomicity principle. 
Other approaches do not use the transaction concept at all, but limit themselves to single 
operations against the database (sometimes even to single-tuple operations). 
2.4. Example  database 
Below an example beer database is introduced that is used in the examples of this paper. 
The database schema is shown in Table 1; it consists of a relation beer describing for each 
beer the name, brewery, type, and alcohol percentage, a relation brewery describing for each 
brewery the name and location, and a relation drinker describing for each drinker his/her 
favorite beer and the quantities bought and drunk of this beer. 
The example constraints are shown in Table 1 in first order logic notation. The identifiers x
and y denote tuple variables; the other identifiers refer to relations and attributes of the 
example database. Constraint I1 is a simple domain constraint on an attribute of relation 
beer; it states that a beer in the database contains at least some alcohol. Constraint/2 is a 
referential integrity constraint from relation beer to relation brewery, stating that every beer 
in the database is brewed by an existing brewery. Constraint 13 is a unique key constraint, 
stating that the name of a brewery in relation brewery is unique. Tuple constraint 14 states 
that every drinker in the database has bought at least as much beer as he or she drinks. 
Finally, 15 is a dynamic onstraint stating that the quantity Of beer drunk by a person never 
decreases. In this constraint, the notation drinkeroz d refers to the pre-transaction state of 
relation drinker. 
Table 1 
Example database definition 
Relation Attributes 
beer name, brewed_by, type, alcperc 
brewery name, city, country 
drinker name, beer, qty_bought, qty_drunk 
Constraint Definition 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
(Vx E beer.alcperc)(x > O) 
(Vx E beer. brewed_by)(3y E brewery.name)(x = y) 
(Vx, y E brewery)((x.name = y.name) ~ (x = y)) 
(Vx E drinker)(x, qty bought >1 x. qty_drunk ) 
(Vx @ drinker, y E drinker ola) 
((x.name = y.name) ~ (x.qty_drunk >iy.qty_drunk )) 
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3. Research topic overview 
This section discusses a number of important research topics in the field of integrity 
constraint handling in relational database systems. These topics can be classified into four 
categories; these categories and their topics are listed below. 
Constraint ypes and semantics: the various types of integrity constraints discussed in the field 
of relational database systems; the various approaches to full transaction support in 
constraint handling, particularly with regard to transaction atomicity. 
Constraint specification: the various approaches to the specification of integrity constraints, 
and the classes of constraint specification languages; 
Constraint preprocessing: the verification of newly defined constraints, i.e. checking if new 
constraints are correct and meaningful with respect o a number of criteria; the translation 
of constraints from the formalism used for constraint specification to the formalism used 
for constraint enforcement by the system; the optimization of constraint definitions, i.e. 
the transformation f constraint definitions to obtain forms that are semantically equiva- 
lent, but that can be enforced more efficiently; 
Constraint enforcement: he various approaches to the actual evaluation or enforcement of
constraints and the execution of violation response actions; the effects of database system 
distribution and parallel processing capabilities on constraint handling; special system 
support aiming at improving the efficiency of constraint enforcement, both in terms of 
software and hardware; the analysis and evaluation of the performance of the constraint 
enforcement process in transaction execution. 
In the sections to follow each of these topics is discussed. 
3.1. Constraint ypes 
Various constraint types and their semantics are an important research topic. It is however 
hard, if not impossible, to design a complete constraint ype classification scheme. An 
overview of important constraint types is given in Table 2. Below, some constraint types are 
discussed in detail. 
3.1.1 Domain and nonnull constraints 
Domain constraints 3 restrict the values that attributes of tuples can assume. Usually, 
domain constraints specify a certain range of values for the attribute, like example constraint 
I1. Sometimes, a domain constraint enumerates the possible values for an attribute, like: 
(Vx E beer. type)(x E {'pilsener', ale', 'stout'} ). 
In the relational model, the enumerated values can be stored in a separate, single-attribute 
relation; the domain constraint has to be implemented then as a referential integrity 
constraint. In this way, a 'variable numerated domain constraint' can be defined [9]. 
Nonnull constraints can be seen as a special case of domain constraints, ince they restrict 
the domain of attributes. Some theoretical work on nonnull constraints can be found in [41]. 
3 Some authors (e.g. [37]) use the term type constraint instead of domain constraint. 
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Transition 
Attribute 
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Domain 
Nonnull 
Tuple Attribute comparison 
Relation 
Database 
Uniqueness (key) 
Functional dependency 
Aggregate 
Transitive closure 
Referential integrity 
Interrelation aggregate 
Attribute Domain 
Tuple Attribute comparison 
Relation Aggregate 
Database Interrelation aggregate 
3.1.2 Referential integrity constraints 
The concept of referential integrity is a central issue in the relational data model, since it is 
an important way to specify semantic links between the various relations in a database. 
Therefore, this type of constraint has received quite some attention, even though it is just 
another type of constraint from a constraint handling viewpoint. 
The original idea of referential integrity is described in [25]. Extensions to this idea are 
given in [28], leading to more usable semantics for constraints. An important extension is 
allowing foreign keys to contain null values. The combination of null values and multi- 
attribute foreign keys can lead to various kinds of problematic situations, however, since it is 
hard to describe the semantics of referential integrity constructs with foreign key values that 
are partly null [30]. 
In [64] the safeness of referential integrity structures i discussed. A structure is considered 
to be unsafe if it causes certain data manipulation problems as a consequence of the order of 
enforcement of referential integrity constraints or the order of tuple manipulations in a 
transaction, or if no correct transition sequence xists that transforms one given consistent 
database state in another given consistent state. 
Referential integrity constraints are even more important if the relational data model is 
used for the representation f object-oriented structures. This topic is discussed for example 
in [63]. 
3.1.3 Recursive constraints 
Recursive queries have been the topic of a reasonable amount of research by now, 
especially transitive closure queries. Integrity constraints with recursive rules have been 
discussed much less, however. The topic is discussed in [19] in the context of deductive 
databases with logic programming interfaces. In the context of relational database systems, 
the topic is described briefly in [46, 47], and mentioned very briefly in [79]. 
In many applications, the use of constraints with transitive closure constructs is natural; 
examples are the following: 
• in an employee database, one may want to specify that no one can be his/her own chief, 
either directly or indirectly; 
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• in a database representing a network (e.g. railroads), one may want to specify that 
every node in the network is reachable from every other node. 
3.1.4 Transition constraints 
In most cases, transition or dynamic constraints described in literature are 'single-step' 
transition constraints, i.e. constraints that are evaluated on a pair of pre-transaction and 
post-transaction states of a database. Constraint 15 from the example database illustrates this 
kind of constraint: 
(Vx E drinker, y E drinker ot d)((x, name = y. name) 
(x. qty_drunk >i y. qty_drunk )). 
Mostly, these constraints are tuple constraints, i.e. they relate old and new attribute values 
in a single tuple. As illustrated by the above example, the notion of a key (attribute name in 
this case) is important for the specification of these constraints. 
An example of a transition constraint on the relation level is the constraint shown below, 
stating that the number of breweries in the database cannot decrease: 
CO UNT(brewery) >! CO UNT(breweryol d) . 
3.1.5 Temporal constraints 
It is possible to describe dynamic onstraints that are not limited to single-step transitions. 
These temporal constraints can be specified using the temporal qualifiers always and 
sometime and their bounded versions always. . ,  until and sometime.. ,  before [33], or other 
forms of temporal logic [23]. 
Two remarks can be made with respect o general temporal constraints. In the first place, 
one can question the relevance to practice of this type of constraints. In the second place, 
practical solutions for the enforcement of this type of constraints are either restricted or very 
inefficient (if possible at all) [33]. A restricted approach is discussed in [23], where a method 
is described for the enforcement of temporal constraints taking only past database states into 
consideration. This method makes use of redundant information to be able to enforce 
temporal constraints without storing the entire history of a database. 
3.1.6 Fuzzy constraints 
Fuzzy relational database systems are systems that can deal with fuzzy or incomplete data. 
In these systems, integrity constraints involve fuzzy constructs as well [73]. Examples of 
fuzzy constraints in an employee database are (taken from [73])': 
• Many managers have a high income (fuzzy domain constraint). 
• Employees having similar jobs and experience must have almost equal salary (fuzzy 
data dependency). 
The specification of fuzzy constraints requires a specification language including fuzzy 
operators. 
3.2. Transaction support 
This section discusses the way constraint handling approaches take transactions into 
consideration. A number of issues are of interest here. The first issue concerns the 
enforcement granularity, with which we mean the complexity of update operations against 
the database the integrity constraint enforcement takes into consideration. The next issue 
concerns transaction atomicity under constraint enforcement; this is considered important o 
obtain full transaction semantics. Finally, the concept of integrity checkpoints i described; 
this concept allows the specification of points in a transaction where the integrity constraints 
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should be enforced, thereby avoiding the complete rollback of complex transactions. These 
issues are discussed below in detail. 
Note that the concept of nested or multi-level transactions ( ee e.g. [5]) can make the 
semantics of constraints more complicated. A proposal for constraints in a multi-level 
transaction environment is given in [75, 54]. 
3.2.1 Enforcement granularity 
In principle, three levels of constraint enforcement granularity can be distinguished: 
Tuple update If the enforcement granularity is tuple update, constraints are enforced after 
every single tuple update operation. In some approaches this is even limited to insertion 
and deletions of single tuples [6, 80]. 
Set update If the enforcement granularity is set update, constraints are enforced after every 
update operation that may involve the update of multiple tuples. 
Transaction If the enforcement granularity is transaction, constraints are enforced at the end 
of a transaction, possibly consisting of multiple set updates. 
3.2.2 Transaction atomicity 
Conceptually, the execution of a transaction T should always satisfy the atomicity 
property; this means that the effect of any execution of T on the initial database state D must 
be such that either the effects of T are completed fully, or D remains unchanged. So, if T 
consists of the actions a l ; . . . ,  a n, the following must hold: 
(T(D)= Da"$) v (T(D)= D) , 
where Da"$ denotes the database state after the execution of a n minus the temporary 
relations created by T. The enforcement of constraints as a consequence of updates 
performed by a transaction T should not violate this property. To be able to support 
transaction atomicity, the enforcement granularity as defined above must clearly be at the 
transaction level. Further, the constraint violation response action must be such that 
transaction atomicity is not violated. An example of an approach that does not satisfy this 
requirement is the query modification technique [81] (see Section 3.7.2). 
In the context of more complex transaction models (e.g. nested transactions [54, 75]), the 
concept of transaction atomicity may have to be redefined. 
3.2.3 Integrity checkpoints 
In the case of complex transactions consisting of multiple operations, the abort of the 
complete transaction as a consequence of a constraint violation may be costly, either in terms 
of the rollback operation or in terms of the work already performed. Therefore, some 
approaches to constraint enforcement use the concept of integrity checkpoints, which are 
points in a transaction where all constraints are enforced. When a constraint violation occurs 
after an integrity checkpoint, the transaction can be undone back to this checkpoint, and 
does not have to be undone completely. User-defined integrity checkpoints are suggested in
the System R approach to constraint handling [91]. It should be noted, however, that a 
partial transaction rollback does not fit nicely in the concept of transaction atomicity. As 
described in Section 2.3, the principle of transaction atomicity implies that only the 
pre-transaction a d post-transaction database states are taken into account in determining 
the correctness of a transaction. 
In the SABRE project, integrity checkpoints are used to find points in a transaction where 
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certain constraints can be enforced, such that they do not have to be postponed until commit 
time [79, 91]. In this approach, integrity checkpoints are automatically established by the 
system through an analysis of the transaction and the constraints. 
3.3. Constraint specification 
The specification of integrity constraints is an important research issue, because the 
specification formalism can determine both the functionality of the constraint handling 
mechanism and the userfriendliness in database design. Four approaches to constraint 
specification can be distinguished: 
Language-oriented In the language-oriented approach, constraints are specified in some kind 
of data definition language. This can either be an extension to the general data definition 
language of the system or a special-purpose constraint definition language. 
Form-oriented In the form-oriented approach, constraints are specified by filling in condi- 
tions in forms generated by the system. Mostly, these forms are a representation of 
existing relations, like in the QBE system [97, 98] (see also Section 4.2). 
Toolbox-oriented The toolbox-oriented approach allows the construction of constraint 
specification with the use of toolboxes providing building blocks and construction primi- 
tives for constraints. An example of this approach can be found in the SuperBase system 
[86]. 
Graphics-oriented In the graphical approach, cofastraints are specified by arranging raphical 
symbols representing constraint constructs in a graphical workspace. An example in the 
context of entity-relationship schema definition is the graphical schema editor of the 
SUPER database visual environment [3]. 
The form-oriented, toolbox-oriented, and graphics-oriented approaches usually concentrate 
on userfriendliness, whereas the language-oriented approach tends to put more stress on 
expressive power. Therefore, the language-based approach can be considered the most 
general. Since user interfaces are not a main topic in this paper, the sequel of this section will 
be devoted to the language-based approach. 
In its most complete form from an operational point of view, the specification of an 
integrity constraint I is a triplet It, c, a] with the following elements: 
Triggers The trigger set t specifies the update types that may violate I; 
Condition The constraint condition c specifies the boolean predicate that has to be satisfied 
by either a database state or a database transition; 
Action The violation response action specifies the action to be executed upon a constraint 
violation. 
In other approaches, like [17, 18], this triplet is denoted in the fully equivalent notation of a 
production rule: 
WHEN t 
I Fc  
THEN a 
Note that the specification of triggers is of an operational nature; in general, the triggers can 
be derived from the constraint rule [17, 18, 46, 47]. 
Below, the specification of these elements in language-oriented approaches i discussed. 
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The most important part of a constraint is the condition. Therefore, attention is first paid to 
a number of condition specification language classes. Next, the specification of triggers and 
violation response actions is discussed. The section is concluded with a few words on the 
procedural approach to the specification of constraints; this approach uses an integrated 
imperative specification of triggers, condition, and violation response action. 
3.3.1 Relational algebra based approach 
In the relational algebra approach, constraints are expressed in (some extension of) the 
relational algebra. A common way to express a constraint is to specify a relational expression 
that calculates the tuples in the database that do not satisfy the constraint. In this way, 
example constraints I1 and 12 are expressed as follows: 
I1: o-~tcp~r,,>obeer 
12: beer - 7r n . . . .  b . . . .  d_by,type,alcperc( beer  ~ b . . . .  d by-,~mebrewery) 
Some approaches add special-purpose constructs to the relational algebra to be able to 
specify constraints (see for instance the approach in the PRISMA project in Section 4.6). 
3.3.2 Relational calculus based approach 
In the relational calculus approach, two variants can be used: the tuple and domain 
calculus [90]. In tuple relational calculus example constraints I1 and I2 are expressed by 
describing the violating tuples as follows: 
I1: {tl beer(t) ^  -~(t[3] > 0)} 
12: {tl (Vu)(beer(t) ^ (Tbrewery(u) v t[2] ~ u[1]))} 
In domain relational calculus we have for the same constraints: 
I1: {tuvwlbeer(tuvw ) ^ 7(w > 0)} 
I2: (tuvw[(Vx, y, z)(beer(tuvw) ^ (Tbrewery(xyz) v u ~ x))} 
Instead of 'pure' relational calculus, also query languages based on relational calculus can be 
used. The SQL language is frequently used for constraint specification, for instance in 
[2, 17]. Using the notation of [17], constraints are expressed by an SQL predicate denoting 
the tuples that violate the constraints. The example constraints are specified in this notation 
as follows: 
I1: alcperc( = 0 
12: brewed_by NOT IN (SELECT name FROM brewery) 
3.3.3 Logic programming approach 
In a logic programming approach, constraints are specified in a Prolog-like syntax. 
Constraints can be specified by logic clauses that define the correct tuples. The example 
constraints then can look like: 
11: beer( . . . . . .  Z ) : -  Z>0.  
I2: beer(_, Y . . . .  ) : -  brewery(Y . . . .  ) .  
In [19] a predicate incorrectdb is introduced that states if a database state is incorrect. Using 
this approach, the example constraints look as follows: 
11: incorrectdb : -  beer( . . . . . .  Z), Z( = 0. 
I2: incorrectdb : -  beer(_, Y . . . .  ), not(brewery(Y . . . .  )) . 
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The logic approach is especially used in the deductive database field. In [69] logic is used for 
constraints and meta-constraints. 
3.3.4 Special-purpose languages 
Several proposals have been made for special-purpose languages or language constructs to 
facilitate the specification of constraints. Some examples are discussed below. 
Constraint equations 
In [66] the use of constraint equations is discussed. Constraint equations are declarative 
expressions of constraints that require consistency between several relations. 
The following example of a constraint equation specifies that the projects of a manager are 
to be the same as the set of projects his employees work on: 
manager.project = = manager, employee.project 
Constructs for common constraints 
Several approaches to constraint specification use simple special-purpose language con- 
structs for commonly used constraints and provide a general mechanism for other con- 
straints. This approach is used for example in the SABRINA system [40, 91]. Referential 
integrity constraint 12 can be specified in this system as follows: 
ASSERT REFERENTIAL DEPENDENCY 
beer. brewed_by FROM brewery, name 
3.3.5 Constraint riggers 
Many approaches to constraint specification allow or require the specification of triggers 
with the constraint rule, indicating the types of updates that may violate the constraint. 
Triggers are used for several purposes: 
System simplification Explicit specification of triggers avoids part of automatic onstraint 
analysis by the system. This simplifies the constraint handling system, but puts the burden 
on the shoulders of the database designer. 
Enforcement efficiency Allowing the database designer to specify application characteristics 
in the form of triggers may enhance the efficiency of constraint enforcement. The database 
designer may know for example that certain update types will never violate certain 
constraints in practice. 
Enhanced functionality In some cases the possibility to specify triggers can enhance the 
functionality of the constraint handling subsystem. This is illustrated by the following 
example on relation drinker. If an application requires that only tuples with attribute 
qty_drunk equal to 0 may be deleted, the following constraint may be specified: 
on delete drinker: qty_drunk = 0 
The use of triggers provides a procedural but simple mechanism for the specification of 
this type of constraints. If the values of deleted tuples can be addressed explicitly, this 
constraint can be specified more declaratively. 4 
4 Using the notation for differential sets as explained in Section 3.6.1, the example constraint can be specified in a 
logic formalism as follows: 
(Vx ~ drinker-, qty drunk)(x = O). 
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3.3.6 Violation response actions 
The default violation response action in most approaches to constraint handling is 
transaction abort. In some cases, the application may require other actions, such as 
cascading updates [29]. We take the referential integrity constraint as an example here; one 
case of this constraint can be specified as: 
12 = [t, r, a] 
t = {insert(beer)} 
r = brewed_by NOT IN (SELECT name FROM brewery) 
a = INSERT INTO brewery VALUES (brewed_by, null, null) 
Note that the specification of a violation response action has imperative semantics. There- 
fore, a purely declarative view on constraints cannot be used when actions are specified. This 
complicates the semantics of constraint enforcement. 
A different approach to specifying constraint violation actions is the specification of 
integrity dependencies [61]. These dependencies denote which variables in constraints can be 
modified upon a violation detection (dependent variables) and which cannot (independent 
variables). Take constraint 14 of the example database as an illustration of this technique to 
describe violation response actions. The definition of this constraint is the following: 
(Vx E drinker)(x, qty_bought >I x. qty_drunk ) 
If qty_bought would be declared the dependent variable and qty_drunk the independent 
variable, a violation of this constraint would be repaired by increasing the value of 
qty_bought to that of qty_drunk. 
3.3.7 Procedural approach 
The procedural approach to the specification of integrity constraints uses programming 
language concepts to build 'constraint enforcement procedures'. This kind of constraint 
specification is of an imperative nature, whereas the approaches to the specification of rules 
as discussed before are of a declarative nature. An example is the way in which constraints 
are specified in the SYBASE system [64, 88]. A partial specification of example integrity 
constraint 12 is given in Table 3. The shown trigger procedure specifies the effect of the 
deletion of brewery tuples. It will be clear that this approach to constraint specification is less 
friendly and more error-prone than the declarative approach. 
Table 3 
Example constraint in SYBASE 
create trigger delete_brewery on brewery for delete as 
begin 
declare @del_beer int 
select @del_beer = count(*) 
from deleted, beer 
where deleted.name = beer.brewed_by 
if @del_beer >0 
begin 
raiserror 1 "deletion of brewery failed" 
rollback transaction 
end 
end 
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3.4. Constraint verification 
When new integrity constraints are defined on a database, it has to be checked if the 
constraints themselves are valid syntactically and semantically. This process is called 
constraint verification here. The verification of a new constraint includes the following issues 
(see also [89, 10]): 
• Checking the syntactic orrectness or well-formedness of the constraint with respect o 
the syntactic rules for specifying constraints. 
• Checking the semantic orrectness of the individual constraint. Relevant aspects are for 
example: do all used relations and attributes exist, are comparisons made only between 
compatible operandsS? 
• Checking if the constraint is not violated by the database state at the time the constraint 
is defined. If the constraint does not hold at definition time, it is likely that no update 
on the database will succeed any more. Clearly, this check can only be performed for 
state constraints. 
• Checking if the constraint is not implied by already existing constraints. If so, the new 
constraint is superfluous. Although a redundant set of constraints is semantically 
correct, it is undesirable from viewpoints of efficiency and constraint maintenance. 
• Checking if the constraint is not contradicted by already existing constraints, i.e. 
checking the consistency of the constraint set. If the set of constraints i inconsistent, no 
valid database states or transitions can exist if the constraint is accepted. Note that for 
state constraints, checking the constraint successfully against he current database state 
is sufficient o prove that there is no contradiction. 
• Checking if the violation response action does not trigger an infinite process of 
compensating actions due to the interaction with other constraints (see e.g. [18]). 
The relevance of the first three issues can be seen as generally accepted. These checks should 
be supported by every real world database system supporting constraints and pose no 
fundamental problems. The last three issues are mainly discussed in the research area. Some 
fundamental problems have to be solved here. 
3.4.1 Consistency of a set of constraints 
The issue of consistency of a set of constraints has received some attention in literature. 
Practical work on constraints and meta-constraints defining the validity of a set of 
constraints is described in [69]. A method to detect a contradiction between constraints i  
described in a logic programming context. The approach is rather informal and based on a 
single application. 
A formal treatment based on logic of constraint set consistency is given in [11]. A 
constraint set is consistent when it is satisfiable. This work distinguishes between finitely 
satisfiable and infinitely satisfiable; finitely satisfiable implies the existence of a finite model 
for the set of constraints, whereas infinitely satisfiable implies the existence of infinite models 
only. Constraint sets are considered acceptable only when they are finitely satisfiable, 
because databases can have finite contents only. The following set of constraints defined on a 
personnel database is an example of a consistent but not finitely satisfiable set (taken from 
[11]): 
• everybody works for somebody; 
• nobody works for himself; 
• if x works for y and y works for z, then x works for z. 
s This issue is related to the concept of underlying domain as introduced in the ALPHA language [24]. This 
concept allows the database designer to specify that certain attributes are not compatible, ven though they have the 
same basic domain. 
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3.4.2 Finiteness of compensating actions 
The issue of infinite compensating actions is addressed in [17, 18]. The problem of 
guaranteeing termination of the constraint enforcement process in case of compensating 
violation response actions is described to be 'almost certainly undecidable in the general 
case'. Therefore, the infinite action detection algorithms perform a worst case analysis of the 
constraint violation actions using a triggering graph, and issue a warning in case of potential 
cyclic behavior. The actual decision is further left to the discretion of the database designer. 
3.5. Constraint ranslation 
The requirements on languages for constraint specification by a database designer and 
constraint enforcement by the database system are generally different. Specification lan- 
guages focus on ease of use and declarative semantics, whereas enforcement languages 
require efficiency and imperative semantics. Therefore, a translation between the two types 
of languages may be necessary. The approach as described in [43, 46] is an example. Here, 
constraints are specified in first-order logic and enforced in an extension to the relational 
algebra. 
Further, some systems allow users to use special anguage constructs to define commonly 
used constraints in an easy way. These language constructs have to be translated to the 
general constraint specification formalism (or directly to the enforcement formalism). 
3.6. Constraint optimization 
The execution cost of constraint enforcement is one of the major problems in the field of 
constraint handling. Therefore, constraint optimization is of great importance. The topic has 
many similarities with query optimization (see e.g. [16]). 
Various types of optimization can be applied to integrity constraints: 
• The amount of data to be checked in constraint enforcement can be reduced by 
evaluating the constraints only on the relevant parts of relations. 
• The constraint rules can be manipulated algebraically toobtain equivalent rules that can 
be evaluated cheaper. 
• In a distributed system with fragmented relations, fragmentation k owledge can be used 
to reduce the number of fragments used in a constraint. 
• The constraint rules can be transformed using semantic knowledge about the applica- 
tion being modelled by the database and about the database itself. 
These topics are discussed below in more detail. 
3.6.1 Data reduction 
A reduction of the amount of data to be checked in constraint enforcement can be 
obtained by inspecting only those parts of relations that have been changed in a relevant 
way. This is usually accomplished by the use of differential sets [79, 40, 43]. In this approach, 
each relation consists of three sets: 
Base set The base set contains the tuples that have not been changed by the current 
transaction. For a relation R, this set can be denoted as R °. 
New set The new set contains tuples that have been inserted and the new values of tuples 
that have been modified by the current ransaction. The new set is usually denoted as R +. 
Old set The old set contains tuples that have been deleted and the old values of tuples that 
have been modified by the current ransaction. The old set is usually denoted as R-. 
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Using these sets, constraint rules can be reformulated. Take as an example the domain 
constraint rule r 1 below that can be reformulated into r2: 
r 1" (VX E beer.alcperc)(x >O) 
r2: (Vx E beer+.alcperc)(x > 0). 
Differential sets can be easily implemented using indexes or markings on the tuples in a 
relation to mark the sets. The principle of data reduction is also used in [17, 18]. 
3.6.2 Syntactical rule manipulation 
Various approaches to the manipulation of integrity constraint rules are described in 
literature. In [68] the simplification of integrity constraints in first-order logic is described. 
The basic principle of the described method relies on the instantiation of formulas obtained 
by substituting for some of their variables the (or some of the) constants occurring in the 
inserted (or deleted, or updated) tuple. The technique is only applicable to transactions 
updating multiple tuples, if the order of the operations in a transaction is immaterial. In [58] 
the simplification of constraints in the context of general transactions i described. The 
simplification is based on the prefix of the constraint (quantifiers). In [43, 47] the rewriting is 
discussed of constraints on fragmented relations pecified in a first-order logic formalism. 
The rewriting consists of pushing quantifiers through set unions and is comparable with 
pushing operations through unions in relational algebra as described in [16]. 
3.6.3 Usage of fragmentation knowledge 
Similar to the use of fragmentation k owledge in query optimization [16], fragmentation 
knowledge can be used for the optimization of constraints in systems with fragmented 
relations [43, 47]. An important example is a referential integrity constraint between two 
horizontally fragmented relations. If the referencing relation is fragmented on the referenc- 
ing attributes (foreign key) and the referenced relation is fragmented on the referenced 
attributes (key) using the same fragmentation algorithm, the enforcement of the referential 
integrity constraint can be reduced from a pairwise checking of all combinations of fragments 
of the two relations to a pairwise checking of the compatible fragments only. 
3.6.4 Semantical rule manipulation 
Constraint rules can be manipulated by applying semantic knowledge about application 
and/or database. A knowledge-based approach to constraint optimization and enforcement 
is described in [71]. In this approach, a constraint manager keeps a knowledge base with 
semantic knowledge about application and database. The knowledge is extracted from the 
database schema definition, from user-defined constraints, and from the results of continuous 
monitoring of the database state. The knowledge is used to optimize and enforce constraints. 
The ideas are, however, a long way from practical applicability. 
3.7. Constraint enforcement 
This section first discusses the constraint enforcement strategy: prevention or detection of 
constraint violations. Next, attention is paid to the handling of the various kinds of system 
responses to constraint violations. 
3.7.1 Violation prevention versus violation detection 
Essentially, there are two strategies to enforce integrity constraints [79, 40]: 
Violation prevention is used, if integrity constraints are enforced before the updates of a 
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transaction are actually applied to the database. In case of a violation, the transaction is
aborted, and there is no need to undo any changes to the database. 
Violation detection is used, if integrity constraints are enforced after the updates of a 
transaction have actually been applied to the database. In case of a violation, the 
transaction is aborted, and the changes performed by the transaction to the database have 
to be undone. 
From a complexity point of view, the violation detection technique is preferable to the 
prevention technique, since updates can be applied to the database, the constraints can be 
evaluated against he database, and standard recovery techniques can be used to undo 
updates in case of a violation. For this reason, the detection technique is used in most of the 
earlier systems, like DB2 [91]. From a performance point of view, the prevention method is 
generally preferable, since it eliminates the need to undo changes to a database, which is 
costly in a disk-based environment. In a main-memory database system, however, this does 
not hold. Further, in a main-memory system like PRISMA/DB [95, 1], it is hard to 
distinguish between the database storage and the transaction workspace, since both are 
managed by the same processes in the distributed memory of the system. In such a situation, 
it is questionable if the distinction between prevention and detection has to be made (see 
below). 
3.7.2 Violation prevention techniques 
Constraint violation prevention can be carried out with a number of rather different 
techniques. These techniques are described in detail below. 
Transaction analysis 
One approach to constraint violation detection is to analyze update transactions statically, 
i.e. without aking the database state upon which they will be executed into consideration. 
This process is called verifying the safeness or consistency of the transaction. As stated in 
Section 2, a transaction T is safe or consistent with respect o a set of integrity constraints 5~ 
and a database schema @, if it cannot violate the integrity of any database state conforming 
to the schema: 
safe( T)C~(VD E ~ )(5~(D ) ~ ~(D, T(D ))) . 
If the transaction is found to be consistent, it can be executed against he database without 
any further constraint enforcement. If the transaction is found to be inconsistent, i  is simply 
rejected. In [38], the consistency of transactions is analyzed with Hoare's axiomatic approach 
to program correctness. In [92] a knowledge-based approach is described. A positive aspect 
of the technique is that it can be applied at transaction definition time and does not imply 
any constraint enforcement overhead at transaction execution time. An evident shortcoming 
of the technique is, however, that it cannot be used for arbitrary transactions and con- 
straints, since it does not take the dynamic properties of the database into account. 
Query modification 
In the query modification approach to constraint enforcement, updates to be performed on 
the database are modified such that they cannot violate the integrity of the database [81]. 
After modification, the updates can be executed without any checks. Updates are modified 
by extending the update qualification predicate with a predicate derived from a constraint 
definition. Take as an example relation beer and domain constraint I1 as described in Section 
2.4. The following update statement: 
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UPDATE beer 
SET  alcperc = alcperc - 1 
WHERE brewed_by = " Geineken" 
is modified to the following statement: 
UPDATE beer 
SET  alcperc = alcperc - 1 
WHERE brewed_by = "Geineken" AND alcperc > 1 
The query modification approach as two major drawbacks. In the first place, the approach 
is not applicable to all constraint types [77]. In the second place, it does not comply with the 
transaction atomicity principle since it merely 'filters out' tuples violating a constraint, but 
does change the other tuples [46, 47]. If the beer relation contains the tuples shown in Table 
4, the update shown above changes two tuples of brewery Geineken, but leaves one tuple as 
it is, and is thus not executed atomically as defined originally. 
Transaction workspace 
Using the transaction workspace approach to constraint violation prevention, the updates 
to be performed to the database are carried out in a temporary workspace of the transaction. 
Next, the constraints are evaluated on this workspace and, if necessary, the database. If a 
constraint violation is detected, the updates in the workspace are simply not propagated to 
the database. If possible, the transaction workspace is kept in main memory to avoid 
unnecessary disk accesses. The transaction workspace method is used in the SABRE/ 
SABRINA project [79, 40]; details can be found in Section 4.4. 
3.7.3 Violation response actions 
When an integrity constraint violation occurs, the system has to execute a violation 
response action. In general, three classes of response actions can be distinguished: 
Error message The most simple (but least satisfactory) approach to handling a constraint 
violation is issuing an error message to the user or application causing the violation. Note 
that this approach fully relies on the user to get the database back into a consistent state. 
Constraints that trigger this type of violation response action are called soft assertions in 
[351. 
Transaction abort A commonly used approach to handling a violation is triggering a 
transaction abort. In case of constraint enforcement through prevention, the updates 
performed by the transaction causing the violation are simply not propagated to the 
database. In case of enforcement through detection, the updates of the transaction have to 
be undone, possibly by using the recovery mechanism of the system. 
Table 4 
Example beer relation 
Name Brewedby Type Alcperc 
Pilsner Gold Geineken Pilsner 5.0 
Super Bock Geineken Bock 7.0 
Ultra Light Geineken Light 0.5 
Extra Stout Huinness Stout 6.0 
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Compensating updates The most complex but also most flexible approach to handling a 
constraint violation is allowing the database designer to specify compensating updates as 
violation response actions. A theoretical treatment of compensating updates can be found 
in [14]. 
It is also possible, of course, to use a combination of the three approaches described above, 
to give the database designer maximum flexibility. 
3.8. Distribution and parallelism 
Constraint handling should be an integral part of distributed atabase systems too. 
Distribution of the database over various sites or nodes has two effects. 
In the first place, relations are generally fragmented and allocated on various sites or 
nodes [16]. This brings two new problems to constraint handling. Constraints pecified in 
terms of relations have to be translated to constraints pecified in terms of relation 
fragments; this problem is discussed in [43, 47]. Also, it has to be decided where the 
constraint enforcement processes have to take place; a discussion of this issue can be found 
in [78]. 
In the second place, distributed systems often offer parallel processing capabilities. These 
capabilities can be used to support parallel constraint enforcement, thereby reducing the 
response times of constraint enforcement; this is very important, since the processing costs of 
constraint enforcement are generally considered one of the main problems in constraint 
handling. It may be clear that parallel processing is more appropriate in distributed atabase 
systems in a multi-processor environment, than in a wide-area network environment. 
3.8.1 Relation fragmentation 
The translation of constraints from the relation to the fragment level can be performed in 
the same way as regular queries (see e.g. [16]). The translation consists of the following steps 
[43, 47]: 
Canonical fragment form The constraints are first translated to the canonical fragment form. 
This form is obtained by replacing all references to global relations by the reconstruction 
of these relations from their fragments. 
Distributed fragment form As a second step, the canonical fragment form is distributed, to 
avoid the reconstruction of global relations and to improve the possibilities for parallel 
enforcement. 
Optimized fragment form The distributed fragment form can then be optimized in a number 
of ways to obtain constraints hat can be enforced more efficiently. An optimization that is 
closely related to relation fragmentation is the omission of parts of constraints that can 
never be violated due to fragmentation constraints. 
In general, this translation of constraints can be performed at constraint definition time. A 
retranslation may be necessary, however, when the fragmentation and/or allocation of 
fragments used in the constraints changes. 
3.8.2 Parallel enforcement 
In principle, the same parallel processing possibilities can be used for constraint enforce- 
ment as for regular query execution. The following parallelism taxonomy can be used [95]: 
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Inter-transaction parallelism In a multi-user database system, several transactions can be 
executed in parallel. As a consequence of this, the constraint enforcement process of these 
transactions can be executed in parallel, as far as this does not violate the serializability of 
concurrently executing transactions. 
Inter-constraint parallelism Within one transaction, the enforcement of several constraints 
can be executed in parallel. This process is closely related to the scheduling of the 
execution of various actions within one transaction [48]. 
Intra-constraint parallelism Within the enforcement of one constraint, we have the same 
possibilities for parallelism as within the execution of one single query, by executing the 
various relational operators in parallel. Intra-constraint parallelism can be subdivided 
further in: 
Task spreading Task spreading parallelism is obtained by executing the same operator on 
the various fragments of a relation or intermediate result in parallel. 
Pipelining Pipelining parallelism is obtained by executing the various stages of relational 
operators within the execution of a constraint in parallel. 
3.9. Special system support 
One of the main problems of constraint enforcement is the large cost associated with it. 
Therefore, techniques have been developed to improve the efficiency of constraint enforce- 
ment. In general, three approaches can be distinguished. First, the database system can keep 
special (redundant or summary) data that facilitate the evaluation of constraints. Secondly, 
the system can support special-purpose low level algorithms for constraint enforcement. 
Thirdly, the system can be equipped with special-purpose hardware to speed up constraint 
enforcement. The first two approaches can be used in general database systems. The last 
approach is usually restricted to high-performance database machines. The various ap- 
proaches are discussed below in detail. 
3.9.1 Redundant data 
One way to reduce the cost for integrity constraint enforcement is to have the database 
system keep redundant data that can be used in the evaluation of integrity constraints. A
form of redundant data that is used very frequently in database systems is an index. This 
type of low level data will not be considered here. 
In [6] the use of redundant data is described for the enforcement of certain classes of 
integrity constraints called two-free assertions. The redundant data required for constraint 
enforcement are aggregates (minima and maxima of domains). The correctness of the 
algorithms is demonstrated using Hoare's program logic. The method is only applicable to 
single-tuple inserts and deletes. 
In the SABRE system [77, 79] redundant aggregate values are maintained by the system to 
reduce the costs of enforcing constraints with aggregates. 
3.9.2 Low level algorithms 
In addition to a general constraint enforcement mechanism that can handle all kinds of 
constraints, a system may be equipped with special-purpose low level algorithms that can 
enforce heavily used constraint ypes more efficiently than the general mechanism. Con- 
straint types that may be suited for this approach are the structural constraints of the 
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relational model: domain, referential integrity, and key uniqueness constraints (see example 
constraints I1-13). 
In the PRISMA project this approach is taken [44]. The parallel data management layer of 
the PRISMA database system is equipped with a special-purpose interface for the specifica- 
tion of certain kinds of constraints that can be enforced more or less autonomously by this 
layer as part of the two-phase commit protocol. 
3.9.3 Hardware support 
A way to improve the performance of a database machine is the use of special-purpose 
hardware. Examples are database filters that perform a first phase of filtering on disk I /O 
and join processors that can perform join operations very efficiently. These special-purpose 
hardware devices may also be used to speed up integrity constraint enforcement. 
In [70] the use of filter chips for constraint enforcement is discussed. These filter chips are 
designed to perform selection, projection, and join operations to improve the performance 
of general database operations. 
3.10. Constraint enforcement performance 
There has not been much attention in literature for the performance analysis and 
evaluation of integrity constraint enforcement in relational database systems. With per- 
formance analysis, the quantitative analysis of models of constraint enforcement algorithms 
is meant. With performance evaluation, the evaluation of constraint enforcement algorithms 
through measurements on actual systems is meant. 
3.10.1 Performance analysis 
In [4] a quantitative analysis of three constraint enforcement s rategies i made: 
• transaction compile time enforcement, meaning that the execution of a transaction is
not started before all constraints are evaluated to hold; thus, the correctness of the 
transaction is established before it is actually executed; 
• transaction run time enforcement, meaning that the constraints are enforced during 
transaction execution while the actual updates have not yet been carried out; note that 
this is the same as violation prevention as described in [40]; 
• post transaction execution enforcement, in which the constraints are evaluated after all 
updates have been performed against the database; this is the same as violation 
detection as described in [40]. 
The costs of the three methods are measured only in I /O costs. A number of further 
simplifications are made that limit the practical usability of the proposed model. According 
to the paper, run time constraint enforcement is superior to any of the other methods 
examined for realistic database operations (i.e. with most transactions committing). In some 
situations, compile time enforcement yields a better performance. 
In the context of the SABRE project (see Section 4.4) some attention has been devoted to 
the performance modeling of constraint enforcement [77, 78]. The cost of constraint 
enforcement is modeled as the number of I /O operations necessary to read and write data 
from/to disk. Both domain and referential integrity constraints are discussed. The method 
for enforcement of domain constraints is compared quantitatively with the query modi- 
fication method [81]; the analysis hows a general superiority of the SABRE approach. 6 
6 This observation is, however, mainly caused by the fact hat he analysis based on the assumption that uples 
violating the constraint have to be presented tothe user. As a consequence of this choice, the query modification 
approach requires the execution of an additional retrieval operation, whereas the SABRE approach as the 
violating tuples readily available. 
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3.10.2 Performance valuation 
The actual performance valuation of existing constraint enforcement systems has hardly 
got any attention in literature. The only known work in this field is that performed in the 
context of the SABRE and PRISMA projects. 
In [77] the enforcement of domain and referential integrity constraints i  evaluated. For 
these experiments, the SABRE system runs on a MULTICS system and manages a small toy 
database. As may be expected, the experiments show that the enforcement of referential 
integrity constraints is more costly than the enforcement of domain constraints. In [79] 
similar experiments are described, but now with SABRE running on a SM90 machine and 
managing an adapted Wisconsin database [7]; the relation sizes are still fairly small (3000 
tuples). 
A performance valuation of constraint enforcement in a parallel main-memory environ- 
ment has been performed in the context of the PRISMA project [49]. In the evaluation, the 
DBMS runs on an 8-node shared-nothing POOMA multiprocessor. The experiments contain 
enforcement of domain and referential integrity constraints on medium-size databases 
(10000 and 50000 tuples). The evaluation focuses on the effects on integrity control of 
parallel constraint enforcement and main-memory data storage. 
4. Research system overview 
This section provides an overview of a number of research projects in which database 
systems were or are developed that support integrity constraints. The following systems are 
discussed: System R and DB2, QBE and OBE, INGRES, SABRE/SABRINA, 
POSTGRES, PRISMA, Starburst, and a few small scale projects. An introduction to a 
number of these projects can be found in [91]. It should be clear that the systems discussed 
in this section are not the only relational database systems that support integrity constraints. 
Some other systems are commercially available that have complete integrity constraint 
handling, like SYBASE [87]; there is, however, hardly any scientific literature available 
discussing the details of these systems. 
The larger projects are all described in three parts. The first part provides a short 
introduction to the project. The second part discusses the specification and preprocessing of
integrity constraints; preprocessing includes verification, compilation, simplification, and 
optimization. The third part describes the constraint enforcement algorithms. The smaller 
projects are described shorter. The last part of this section presents a number of comparisons 
between the systems described; in one comparison, a few other commercial systems are 
included as well. 
Note that the description of the systems is mainly based on the original design of the 
systems. Some systems, like INGRES, have been extended later with mechanisms not 
discussed in this paper. 
4.1. System R and DB2 
System R was developed by the IBM San Jose Research Laboratory between 1975 and 
1979 [2, 22]. The system is one of the first complete prototypes of a relational database 
management system. In this project he SQL language (originally called SEQUEL) has been 
designed [21, 34]. The techniques developed in the system R project have been incorporated 
into the commercial DB2 (and SQL/DS) system. 
A functional description of a complete integrity subsystem for System R is given in [35]. 
The functionality described in this paper is rather complete; the actual implementation i
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system R and DB2 is, however, rather restricted (only uniqueness constraints on keys are 
supported in System R [91], recent versions of DB2 also include other constraints ypes like 
referential integrity [32]). 
4.1.1 Constraint specification 
The definition of an integrity constraint is established by an assertion, expressed in SQL 
predicates, on a relation or a view. Any constraint that may be expressed by predicates in 
the WHERE clause of an SQL query may be defined. Transition constraints are supported 
by allowing the explicit specification of the OLD and NEW states of data. Further, key 
uniqueness constraints can be defined. 
Constraints can be declared to be IMMEDIATE, with enforcement immediately after an 
update operation, or DELAYED, with enforcement at the end of a transaction. Newly 
defined constraints are validated against he current database state and stored in the data 
dictionary of the system. 
4.1.2 Constraint enforcement 
Updates performed by transactions are made on a copy of the base relations, and 
constraints are evaluated on the updated copy. In case of a violation, the pre-transaction 
state of the database is restored by application of the recovery mechanism of the system. 
Transactions may specify integrity points, however, invoking the enforcement of the 
constraints during transaction execution. This allows a partial transaction restart from the 
last integrity point in case of a constraint violation. 
4.2. QBE and OBE 
The Query-by-Example (QBE) relational product was developed by the IBM Thomas J. 
Watson Research Center in the mid-seventies [97]. The emphasis in this project was on an 
easy to use form-oriented database language. QBE has been adapted to an integrated office 
automation system, called OBE [99]. 
QBE has an integrated support for integrity constraints [98]; the emphasis i on constraints 
specification, ot on constraint enforcement. 
4.2.1 Constraint specification 
In QBE integrity constraints are specified in the same form-driven way as relations are 
defined or queries are specified [97, 98, 90]. In forms representing database relation 
skeletons the user can specify the constraints in an easy way, using constants, variables, 
keywords, and simple constructs. The formalism supports a full range of constraint types, 
among which domain constraints, uniqueness (key) constraints, functional dependencies, 
inter-attribute comparisons, and transition constraints [97]. Further, the user can use triggers 
to define upon which events a constraint should be enforced. 
Table 5 shows a simplified example of constraints defined on a relation EMPLOYEE; the 
Table 5 
Example QBE constraint definitions 
Employee Name Salary Manager Department 
(1) KEY 
(2) CONSTR0, U) 
(3) CONSTR0, U) 
(4) CONSTR(D) 
(5) CONSTR(I, U) 
Tom 
COUNT Tom > 2 
Tom 
<10 000 
~Tom 
• COUNTEd=I  . 
Sales 
Dep 
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constraints are shown in the form specified by the user. The constraint definitions have the 
following meaning. 
(1) The attribute NAME is the key of relation EMPLOYEE. 
(2) The salaries in the Sales department must be less than 10 000. Both Sales and 10 000 are 
constants in this constraint. The constraint has to be enforced upon insert or update 
operations on the relation. 
(3) An employee cannot be his own manager. The underlined word indicates avariable; the 
name is arbitrary. 
(4) Every department must have at least 3 employees. The constraint has to be enforced 
upon delete operations on the relation. 
(5) Each employee has exactly one manager (this is an example of a functional dependency 
constraint). 
4.2.2 Constraint enforcement 
The QBE system does not support he explicit notion of transactions. Update commands 
can, however, be grouped (a user can submit an entire screenful of commands to the 
system). Integrity constraints are enforced at the end of the execution of the entire group, 
thereby allowing the database to go through incorrect states during the execution of a group 
of commands. 
4.3. INGRES 
The INGRES project was conducted at the University of California t Berkeley from 1973 
to 1980. It is one of the first major efforts to build a relational database management system. 
A complete description of the development of INGRES can be found in [82]. From 1981, 
INGRES was marketed as a commercial product by Relational Technology Inc. The original 
data definition and manipulation language of INGRES is called QUEL, a language based on 
tuple relational calculus [34]. 
Integrity constraint support has been one of the research topics of the project. This has led 
to the development of the well-known method of query modification, described in [81]. 
4.3.1 Constraint specification 
In INGRES, the definition of an integrity constraint is expressed as a QUEL qualification. 
Although algorithms for processing all types of constraints that may be expressed by 
predicates are given in [81], the original implementation was restricted to single-variable 
constraints without aggregates (domain and transition constraints). 7 According to [77], 
constraints on deleted tuples (for instance in referential integrity constraints) and constraints 
that require duplicate limination cannot be specified. 
When an integrity constraint is defined on a relation, it is verified against he current state 
of that relation. Accepted constraints are stored in the data dictionary of the system, which is 
organized as a metabase containing among others the relation INTEGRITY. 
4.3.2 Constraint enforcement 
Integrity constraints are enforced by means of query modification. This means that the 
qualification of an update operation is modified with the qualification representing the 
constraints defined on the relation being updated (a simple conjunction of the qualifiers is 
used). As such, query modification performs constraint enforcement by prevention of 
constraint violation, not by detection. 
7 Recent commercial versions of INGRES include more general constraint handling mechanisms, see e.g. [64]. 
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As mentioned before, query modification merely places a filter on update operations to 
remove incorrect values, it does not comply with transaction semantics (the atomicity of 
transactions i  violated). 
4.4. SABRE and SABRINA 
SABRE and SABRINA 8 are relational database management systems developed in the 
SABRE project at INRIA in cooperation with MASI laboratory in France [39]. The project 
started in the early eighties. Most of the solutions implemented in the prototype have been 
incorporated into a commercial product marketed since 1986. 
One of the main research topics of the project is a complete support of semantic data 
integrity [77, 79]. Further topics that are relevant here are the support of efficient ransaction 
management and the possibility to experiment with parallelism. 
The constraint enforcement algorithms of SABRE are extended in [78] to distributed 
database systems. An introduction to the basic ideas can also be found in [40]. 
4.4.1 Constraint specification 
In SABRE and SABRINA, an integrity constraint is specified as a tuple relational calculus 
assertion or by a special construct corresponding to predefined types of integrity constraints 
(like referential integrity). A constraint specification i relational calculus is labeled with the 
update type upon which the constraint must be enforced. New and old states of relations can 
be specified explicitly to enable the specification of transition constraints. 
The constraint specifications are translated by a constraint compiler into a set of 
assertions, each referring to a base relation for a particular type of update. Some classes of 
assertions can be further simplified to improve the efficiency of constraint enforcement [79]. 
The assertions are evaluated against he current database state; if no violation occurs, they 
are stored in the data dictionary of the system. 
4.4.2 Constraint enforcement 
During transaction execution, tuples to be updated are isolated in two temporary relations 
called differential relations. One contains tuples to be inserted, the other contains tuples to 
be deleted. The integrity constraints are evaluated against hese differential relations. If all 
constraints are satisfied, the updates in the differential sets are applied to the actual 
database; if a violation occurs, the updates are rejected and the user is informed. As such, 
the system uses a constraint violation prevention method, rather than a detection method. 
Theoretically, integrity constraints must be enforced at transaction end. The system can 
detect, however, that some constraints can be enforced at the end of a single update 
operation. Using this technique, it is possible to determine integrity enforcement points 
within a transaction, enabling partial validation of the updates of a transaction. The current 
implementation f the system enforces all constraints at transaction end. 
Constraints are divided into three categories according to their enforcement cost and 
complexity: 
(1) individual assertions (single-relation constraints such as domain and uniqueness con- 
straints); 
(2) multi-relation assertions (like referential integrity constraints); 
(3) assertions with aggregate functions. 
For each category, an efficient enforcement algorithm is defined. For aggregate constraints, 
8 The earlier papers from the SABRE project use SABRE as the name for the DBMS, whereas later papers use 
SABRINA.  
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redundant information is maintained in the database to avoid the repetitive calculation of the 
aggregate values. 
A quantitative analysis of the constraint enforcement algorithms for domain and referen- 
tial integrity constraints can be found in [77]. 
4.5. POSTGRES 
POSTGRES is an extended relational database management system designed at the 
University of California at Berkeley during the second half of the eighties [83, 85]. The 
system is the successor to the INGRES system, adding many new features like support for 
complex objects, extendibility for user-defined data types and facilities for active databases 
in the form of a rule system. The system is designed as close to the standard relational model 
as possible. POSTGRES uses the POSTQUEL language for data definition and manipula- 
tion [74]; this language is based on QUEL [55]. 
POSTGRES does not have special-purpose upport for integrity control, but its rule 
system can be used for integrity constraint enforcement [84]. The first version of the rule 
system has been implemented [84, 85]; the description below is based on this version. 
Because of functional shortcomings and fundamental complexity of the first version of the 
rule system, it will be replaced by a second version in due course [85]. 
4.5.1 Constraint specification 
POSTGRES supports the query language POSTQUEL [74], which is based on its 
predecessor QUEL [55]. Any POSTQUEL command can be tagged with special modifiers 
which change the commands to rules. These rules can be used for integrity control. Two 
modifiers are relevant in the context of integrity control. A POSTQUEL command tagged 
with the always modifier logically appears to run forever. Update commands used in this way 
can maintain the integrity of the database. Table 6 shows how an example domain constraint 
I1 can be specified using this construct. A POSTQUEL command tagged with the refuse 
modifier can never run. This construct can be used to specify update operations that would 
invalidate the integrity of the database. Constraint 12 in Table 6 is a partial specification of a 
referential integrity constraint using the refuse modifier. 
To avoid ambiguity in multiple rule semantics and to allow the specification of exception 
situations, POSTGRES allows the specification of a priority level per rule. 
The second version of the rule system will be based on a more conventional production 
rule syntax for rule specification. 
4.5.2 Constraint enforcement 
In POSTGRES, integrity constraint enforcement consists of the execution of rules that 
specify the constraints. The execution has two important characteristics that can be changed 
by a rule optimizer to obtain optimal performance. 
In the first place, the time of triggering of rules tagged with the always modifier can be 
chosen. The first option is early evaluation or forward chaining, meaning that a rule is 
executed when an update changes part of the database such that the execution of the rule is 
Table 6 
Example constraints in POSTGRES 
11 delete always beer 
where beer.alcperc( = 0
12 refuse delete brewery 
where brewery.name = beer.brewed_by 
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needed to obtain a correct state again. The second option is late evaluation or backward 
chaining, meaning that a rule is executed when a database action requires access to part of 
the database of which the integrity was violated by a prior update. 
In the second place, the granularity of locking for rules can be chosen. 9 The options are 
relation level and tuple level locking. Clearly, relation level locking is preferable in the case 
when few rules are defined on a large quantity of data, whereas tuple level locking is 
preferable in the situation with many rules concerning small quantities of data. The locking 
strategy can be enhanced to allow dynamic escalation of tuple level locks to relation level 
locks. 
In the case of rules with small scope, rule execution is based on markers per tuple that 
trigger actions; in the case of rules with large scope, a query rewrite scheme is used 
comparable to query modification [81]. 
POSTGRES builds a graph representing rule invocations to avoid cyclical triggering of 
multiple rules. If this graph is not tree-shaped, the system generates an error message. 
4.6. PR ISMA 
In the PRISMA project a parallel, main-memory, relational database system has been 
developed [95, 1], designed to run on a shared-nothing, multiprocessor hardware architec- 
ture. ~° The second operational prototype of the PRISMA database management system 
(PR1SMA/DB1) includes a complete constraint handling subsystem based on transaction 
modification [46, 47]. This subsystem uses parallelism for the efficient enforcement of 
constraints on fragmented relations. Transaction modification is used to support a broad 
class of constraint ypes [47]; the current implementation of PRISMA/DB1 only supports 
domain, uniqueness, and referential integrity constraints, however. 
4.6.1 Constraint specification 
In the transaction modification approach, constraints are specified in a first-order logic 
formalism (the current implementation uses a simple ad hoc formalism). Constraint defini- 
tion is performed with full fragmentation and location transparency [16]. Newly defined 
constraints are handled by a DBMS component called the constraint compiler. 
The constraint compiler has three tasks in preparing constraints for transaction modi- 
fication. First, it optimizes the constraints in a number of ways [43, 47]. Secondly, it removes 
fragmentation transparency. Thirdly, it translates constraints into an extension of the 
relational algebra [43, 47], called XRA [45]; the translated constraints are directly executable 
by the relational execution layer of the system. The example constraints are shown in XRA 
format in Table 7. I~ 
Table 7 
Example constraints in XRA format 
I2 I alarm (sel (not alcperc>0), beer) 
m 
12 I alarm (diff (uniq (proj (brewedby. beer)), proj (name, brewery))) 
The locking strategy for rules in POSTGRES is rather complex, since the system supports no less than 13 kinds 
of locks [84]. 
~0 The PRISMA project should not be confused with the PRISM project [76] or the PRIMA project [54, 75]. 
Both projects also pay attention to integrity constraint handling: PRISM deals with a knowledge based approach to 
constraint management, and PRIMA deals with constraint handling in a complex object database. 
L~ The alarm operator isspecially included in XRA to allow the specification f constraints; he operator t iggers a
transaction abort if its argument is non-empty. 
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The constraint compiler can also decide to have some constraint types enforced autonom- 
ously by the relational execution layer of the system to reduce the overhead in constraint 
enforcement through transaction modification [44]. 
4.6.2 Constraint enforcement 
In PRISMA/DB, constraints are always enforced at transaction commit time, thereby 
ensuring full transaction semantics. During transaction execution, the transaction manage- 
ment layer of the system analyses the transaction to record which relation fragments are 
updated by the transaction. When the transaction management layer reaches the commit 
point of a transaction, it retrieves the constraints of updated fragments from the data 
dictionary of the system, and performs ome filtering on these. Next, the actual transaction 
modification takes place by concatenating the constraint specifications to the transaction. 
The modified transaction is executed in the same way as an unmodified transaction, using the 
full possibilities for parallel execution [95, 48, 96]. In case of a constraint violation, the 
modified transaction is either aborted using the normal abort protocol, or the modified 
transaction performs compensating updates to reach a correct database state. 
Autonomous enforcement of constraints by the relational execution layer of the system 
takes place without any intervention from the transaction management layer. In case of a 
constraint violation, the transaction is aborted using the normal abort protocol. 
4.7. Starburst 
Starburst is a prototype relational database management system under development a the 
IBM Almaden Research Center [50, 62]. One of the goals of the Starburst project is to build 
an extensible system that can support non-traditional pplications and can serve as a testbed 
for innovations and improvements in database technology. Constraint handling in Starburst 
relies on a general-purpose production rules facility that is developed as an extension to 
Starburst [93, 62]. This facility allows the definition of database operations that are executed 
automatically whenever certain events occur or certain conditions are met. The production 
rules mechanism in Starburst can also be used for the maintenance of derived data [20] and 
the construction of knowledge base systems. 
4.7.1 Constraint specification 
In Starburst, constraints are specified in a set-oriented database rule language based on 
SQL [93]. A rule in Starburst is identified by its name and the relation on which the rule is 
defined. A rule further consists of four parts. The rule transition predicate specifies the 
triggering operations of the rule in terms of insert, delete, and update (on specified 
columns). The rule is triggered if the specified operations occurred on the specified relation 
in the net effect of a database transition. The rule condition is an arbitrary SQL predicate 
over the database. If it evaluates to true, the action list of the rule is executed. The rule 
action list consists of arbitrary Starburst database operations, including data manipulation 
operations, data definition commands and rollback requests. Finally, the precedence part of a 
rule lists the rules of which the execution has to precede, respectively follow, the execution 
of the rule at hand, and is used to define rule priorities. The condition and action list of a 
rule may refer to both the current state of the database and transition tables that contain the 
net changes to the database that have occurred uring the database transition. 
In [17, 18] a facility is discussed to derive these production rules from constraint definitions 
stated in an SQL-based language. This facility generates the transition predicate, analyses 
sets of rules for potential cyclical triggering behaviour, and performs ome optimizations on 
the rule conditions. 
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4.7.2 Constraint enforcement 
When a transaction (a sequence of SQL operations) is executed on Starburst, this may 
cause a change in the database state. This state change creates the first transition that 
triggers a set of rules. Taking specified precedences between rules into consideration, one 
rule from this set is chosen. If the condition of the chosen rule evaluates to false, another 
rule is chosen from the set. If the condition evaluates to true, the actions of the rule are 
executed. The database state change composed of the original transaction and the execution 
of the actions of the rule constitutes the next relevant transition for rule evaluation. A given 
rule is triggered at a certain point if its transition predicate holds with respect o the 
(composite) transition since the point at which its condition was most recently evaluated; if 
the rule's condition has not been evaluated before, the transition is taken from the start of 
the transaction. If a rollback action is encountered during rule execution, the system undoes 
the transaction, including the effects o£ previously executed rule actions, and rule processing 
terminates. Otherwise, rule processing terminates when the set of triggered rules is empty or 
when no triggered rule has a condition that evaluates to true; in this case the entire 
transaction is committed. 
Rule condition evaluation and rule action execution is handled by the Starburst query 
processor, thereby ensuring serializability of transactions including rule actions. The rule 
system itself must enforce concurrency control for transactions that affect he set of rules in 
the system, i.e. for transactions that include any form of rule definition. Also, the rule 
system must provide means to roll back the effects of transactions that affect he set of rules 
in the system, to guarantee atomicity of this kind of transactions in the case of transaction 
abort. 
4.8. Other systems 
4.8.1 System by small 
At the University of London a Constraint Enforcement System has been developed for a 
database system based on the Binary Relational Model [80]. In this approach, constraints are 
specified in a subset of first order predicate calculus. Each constraint definition is translated 
into a single query specified in a logic programming formalism. The translation takes place in 
a few simple rewriting steps, Upon updates against he database, the updated tuples are 
matched against the set of constraints. Matched constraints are evaluated against the 
database using a resolution based theorem prover. If a constraint is violated, the update 
operation is aborted, and the violating tuples are presented to the user. The presented 
algorithms are suited for single tuple insert and delete operations only; h~tadling of 
multi-tuple update operations requires modification of the algorithms. General constraints 
are supported by the system, with the exception of transition constraints and aggregate 
constraints. A small scale implementation f the system has been completed. 
4.8.2 AIM 
AIM is an extension to the INGRES system to provide a nontrivial semantic ontrol 
mechanism [26]. The system has been developed at the University of Dortmund, Germany. 12
Following the AIM approach, integrity constraints are partitioned into two categories: 
constraints that are enforced upon every relevant update of the database, and constraints 
that are checked periodically (batch constraints). A constraint is specified using a QUEL- 
~2 This AIM system has no relation to the IBM project with the same name, in which a DBMS for extended NF2 
relations was designed [27]. 
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based formalism. Constraint enforcement takes place by submitting a query with as 
qualification the negation of the QUEL predicate stated in the constraint. For most 
constraint ypes, AIM implements a detection and rollback strategy for constraint enforce- 
ment. For some simple types of constraints, the system can use a prevention strategy, 
making use of temporary relations. Further, the system supports transactions, by enforcing 
constraints at transaction end (except for the constraints enforced by prevention). 
4.9. System comparison 
Below, the systems described above are compared on a number of characteristics with 
respect o constraint handling: supported constraint types, constraint preprocessing charac- 
teristics, and constraint enforcement characteristics. 
4.9.1 Supported constraint types 
An overview of the integrity constraint types supported by implemented systems is given 
in Table 8.13 The table lists most systems discussed in this section plus a few commercial 
systems. 
Note that POSTGRES and Starburst do not have integrated support for specific constraint 
types, but provide a general production rule-based extension to handle a large spectrum of 
constraint ypes (see Sections 4.7 and 4.5 for details). Similarly, SYBASE has specific 
support for some constraint types, but provides a trigger mechanism for more general types. 
From this table it may be clear that some systems actually support only a very limited set 
of constraint types, although some of them are based on a complete-conceptual design and 
have been under development for a considerable period (like DB2 and INGRES). 
4.9.2 Constraint preprocessing characteristics 
In Table 9 the following characteristics of constraint preprocessing in existing systems are 
listed: 
Constraint verification This column in the table lists if the system supports constraint 
verification as discussed in Section 3.4. Note that syntactic and simple semantic hecks 
(attribute types) on individual constraints are considered standard here, and are not listed 
in the table. 
Tab le  8 
Suppor ted  constra int  ypes in imp lemented  systems 
Domain  Un ique Referent .  Funct.  Aggre-  Trans-  Genera l  
constr. (key)  integr ity depend,  gate it ion constr.  
DB2 - yes . . . . .  
INGRES yes yes . . . . .  
ORACLE yes yes . . . . .  
SABRINA yes yes yes yes yes yes - 
POSTGRES . . . . . .  rules 
PR ISMA yes yes yes . . . .  
Starburst  . . . . . .  ru les 
SYBASE yes yes yes - - - tr iggers 
UNIFY  yes yes yes . . . .  
Smal l  yes yes yes yes - - - 
A IM yes yes yes yes yes yes - 
13 This  table is part ly  based on in format ion in [91] and may therefore not  reflect the most recent status of certa in 
systems. Some papers  by other  authors  (e.g. [63]) even seem to contradict  his information.  
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Tab le  9 
Constra int  preprocessing characteristics in implemented systems 
Translat ion 
System Verification F rom To Opt imizat ion 
DB2 curr. state - 
INGRES curr. state - 
SABRINA curr. state special DDL  rel. calc. yes 
POSTGRES - - yes 
PR ISMA - special DDL  rel. a lgebra yes 
Starburst  - - 
Small pred. calculus logic. DML - 
A IM . . . .  
Constraint translation The two columns in the table under translation list if the system 
supports translation from a specification language to a different internal (enforcement) 
language, and if so, which language classes are used (see Section 3.3). 
Constraint optimization The optimization column lists if the system supports constraint 
optimization techniques. 
4.9.3 Constraint enforcement characteristics 
In Table 10 a number of characteristics of the constraint enforcement algorithms of 
existing database systems are listed: 
Enforcement s rategy This column lists the constraint enforcement s rategy employed by the 
system: constraint violation prevention before the database is actually updated, or 
violation detection after the database has been updated; further details are discussed in 
Section 3.7. 
Transaction atomicity This column specifies whether a system supports full transaction 
atomicity; see Section 3.2 for a more complete treatment of this issue. 
Integrity checkpoints Some systems use the concept of integrity checkpoints to establish the 
correctness of the database at a certain point during transaction execution to enable a 
partial transaction rollback (see Section 3.2). 
Tab le  10 
Constra int  en forcement  characterist ics of imp lemented  systems 
Enforcement  Transact ion Integrity Parallel 
System strategy atomicity checkpoints enforcement  
DB2 detect ion optional yes - 
INGRES prevent ion - - - 
SABRINA prevent ion yes - see text 
POSTGRES prev. / detect,  no no no 
PR ISMA see text yes - yes 
Starburst  detect ion yes no - 
Small  detect ion - - - 
A IM detect ion optional - - 
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Parallel enforcement To decrease constraint enforcement execution times and thereby 
transaction response times, parallelism may be used in constraint enforcement; further 
details can be found in Section 3.8. 
Two entries in the table require some comment. First, in the PRISMA system it is hard to 
distinguish between enforcement through violation prevention of detection because of the 
data storage organization of this system; this topic was discussed in Section 3.7. Secondly, 
parallelism is a research issue in the SABRINA project [91], but the literature does not state 
if parallelism is actually used in constraint enforcement. 
5. Conclusions 
A number of general remarks can be made with respect to the current state of the research 
into integrity control in relational databases. A number of important remarks - at least from 
the authors point of view - are listed below. 
In general, there is still a large gap between the theoretic approach to constraint handling 
and the actual implementation in complete relational database management systems. Most 
implementations are incomplete, in the sense that they accept only limited constraint types, 
do not support full transaction semantics etc. 
The importance of transactions as atomic units of work against a database has not been 
generally accepted in the research on integrity constraints. Part of the research does not take 
transactions into consideration at all, part does take transactions into account, but does not 
comply with the atomicity principle. 
The integrity control mechanism in a database management system can be specially 
constructed for this task, or can rely on some general mechanism. If a specially constructed 
mechanism exists, it can be specially designed for a limited set of constraint types, or it can 
be designed to handle arbitrary constraint types. So, the integrity control mechanism in a 
DBMS can have one of three levels of generality (see Fig. 1 ): integrity control can be 
performed by a mechanism designed to handle a limited set of constraint types, the task can 
be performed by a mechanism designed to handle all constraint types, or it can be performed 
by a general purpose rule or trigger subsystem that can be used for other tasks too. 
An important criterium for the classification of integrity control mechanisms i  the fact 
whether the mechanism employs a violation prevention or detection technique. In a 
main-memory environment where updates take place in the same memory space where the 
database is actually stored, it is hardly relevant, however, to distinguish between violation 
prevention using the transaction workspace model and violation detection. 
Only little attention has been devoted to the performance of integrity control subsystems, 
General Rule 
Mechanism 
General Constraint 
Mechanism 
Special Constraint 
Mechanism 
Fig. 1. Integrity control mechanisms. 
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both in terms of analysis and evaluation of systems. This observation is not in accordance 
with the general opinion that performance is one of the key problems in real-world integrity 
control. In contrast o the research in the field of query processing, there has been very little 
attention for parallelism in constraint enforcement until now. Typical research on integrity 
control mechanisms hardly takes parallelism into consideration, and typical research on 
parallel database systems does not pay much attention to integrity control. Only in the 
PRISMA project parallelism is taken as a primary research topic in the context of integrity 
constraint handling. 
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